Crime, as a budget line.

The dossier's short answer: the homicide rate is running at 16-17 per 100,000 (16.1 in 2024, 17.4 in 2025 according to the national police (PNC) and InSight Crime; 16.3 annualized in June 2026 according to CIEN), a fraction of the 45.7 peak of 2009; kidnapping is marginal (9 cases in 2024); extortion is the crime that defines the cost of operating (24,978 complaints in 2024, +38%); and container-truck theft was a real crisis in 2023 and early 2024 (up to 200 thefts a month according to the private sector) which, according to PNC statistics cited in the same report, fell to about 2 a month after a public-private working group brought in GPS, escorts and coordinated pursuit — a fall that comes with a change of source and must not be published without explaining it. There is a regulated private security industry: 275 authorized entities and 19,977 agents with valid credentials (July 2026). The highest-risk corridor for cargo is the Pacific route (49% of large-scale hold-ups), not the CA-9 to the Atlantic, although the CA-9 is the most dangerous for road accidents.

Figures

Tasa de homicidios16.1 (2024); 17.4 (2025); 16.3 anualizada jun-20262024-2026

Denuncias de extorsión24,978 (+38%)2024

Secuestros reportados92024

truck-theft series flagged (contradiction #31)

The US Travel Advisory is Level 3, "Reconsider Travel"; in the version in force in 2022: do not travel to Zone 18 and Villa Nueva (Guatemala City) or to the departments of San Marcos and Huehuetenango, other than their departmental capitals; the 2025-2026 version adds "terrorism" after the FTO designations (the text in force was not fetchable). OSAC's country page (seen through a search engine, to be verified) lists zones 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21 and 24 as capital-city areas of concern, in addition to Zone 18 and Villa Nueva. A key nuance from OSAC: not even the most exclusive zones (4, 10, 14, 15, 16) are free of violent crime in broad daylight, although most serious crime is inter-gang and territorial; La Aurora airport sits in zone 13, an area with elevated crime levels — use pre-vetted transport (the "SAFE" kiosk, Uber).

the zone list from the country page was seen through a search summary; the advisory in force remains to be verified

Villa Nueva (a "do not travel" municipality) and Amatitlán are at the same time the historical industrial axis (parks such as Zeta La Unión and the corridor towards Escuintla, dossier 07), and Escuintla simultaneously holds the largest ZDEEPs (Michatoya Pacífico) and 49% of cargo hold-ups. The sector's documented practice is to operate inside closed industrial parks with private perimeter security and to manage the risk in transit, not at the plant. Guatemala and Escuintla account for about 50% of the country's homicides (2024, OSAC).

Figures

Homicidios concentrados en Guatemala y Escuintla~50%2024

On 17 Jan 2026 there were simultaneous riots in three prisons (Renovación I in Escuintla, Fraijanes II and the zone 18 remand center), attributed by Mingob to Barrio 18, with hostages taken (43 according to AP; 46 according to El Imparcial/CNN) and armed attacks on police (7 dead in the first reports; 10 according to AP and Democracy Now as of 20 Jan). President Arévalo decreed a state of siege across the whole national territory for 30 days — Governmental Decree 1-2026, announced on 18 Jan 2026, published in the official gazette (Diario de Centro América) on 19 Jan 2026 and ratified by Congress — with army deployment and the suspension of classes; the US Embassy issued an alert with a temporary shelter-in-place for its personnel. The final casualty count, the text of the decree and the exact end date (AGN: 17 Feb; other outlets: 16 Feb) remain to be verified. Subsequent normalization: in June 2026, 265 homicides were recorded (8.83 a day), an annualized rate of 16.3.

Figures

Estado de sitio30 días, todo el territorio; Decreto Gubernativo 1-2026 publicado 19-ene-2026ene-2026

Policías muertos / rehenes7–10 / 43–46 (varía según medio)ene-2026

Homicidios junio 2026265 (8.83/día); tasa anualizada 16.3jun-2026

casualty figures vary between outlets; the text of the decree remains to be verified

It is no longer the main threat: kidnappings reported by the PNC — 2018: 28; 2019: 17; 2020: 15; 2021: 9; 2022: 11; 2023: 13; 2024: 9. OSAC states that "kidnapping is no longer as viable a criminal enterprise as extortion"; current cases are almost always tied to drug-trafficking disputes, and the State Department does not assign Guatemala the "K" (kidnapping risk) indicator in its Travel Advisory. "Express kidnapping" linked to unlicensed taxis persists as a specific urban risk (dossier 12 §10.4).

Figures

Secuestros reportados282018

Secuestros reportados92024

From OSAC's 2025 country report: (1) vehicles with tinted glass on every window — assailants on motorcycles pick out targets by the light of mobile phones; a new tactic is Bluetooth scanning to locate high-value handsets ("Sam's iPhone"): rename the device and switch Bluetooth off; (2) no intercity travel at night, convoys of at least 2 vehicles outside the capital, and care with navigation apps, which may route through gang-controlled neighbourhoods; (3) official US personnel are barred from using public buses (a priority extortion target), and taxis only if pre-vetted; (4) the PNC lacks staff, equipment and investigative capacity (low base pay, 6 months of training) and there are reports of hold-ups by people in police uniforms or vehicles — the public response does not replace private protocols; (5) PNC emergencies 110/120, fire service 122/123, MP 1574, Crime Stoppers 1561.

In 2024 there were 24,978 extortion complaints (+38% on 2023), according to OSAC, which warns that part of the increase may reflect a greater willingness to report. In June 2026, 1,264 complaints were recorded in the month, with a year-on-year rate of 112.7 per 100,000 (against 151.4 in June 2025) and 8,707 complaints in the first half (5,320 fewer than in the same period of 2025); the year-on-year rate has now fallen for 11 consecutive months. CIEN warns that, without a victimization survey, less crime cannot be told apart from less reporting.

Figures

Denuncias de extorsión24,978 (+38%)2024

Denuncias de extorsión, primer semestre8,707 (−5,320 vs 1S-2025)ene–jun 2026

Tasa interanual de extorsión112.7 por 100k (vs 151.4 en jun-2025)jun-2026

June 2026 figures via the press; cross-check against the bulletin PDF

Extortion complaints (PNC, compiled by CIEN) and the rate per 100,000 inhabitants: 2012: 5,216 (35.3); 2015: 5,036 (32.3); 2018: 8,678 (53.1); 2019: 14,714 (88.6); 2020: 13,031 (77.3); 2021: 13,288 (77.7); 2022: 14,725 (84.8); 2023: 18,096 (102.8), some 50 complaints a day. The full series was cross-checked against CIEN's PDF in audit; 2019 matches the PNC figure cited by OSAC 2020, and 2022 matches OSAC 2025.

Figures

Denuncias de extorsión5,216 (tasa 35.3)2012

Denuncias de extorsión14,714 (88.6)2019

Denuncias de extorsión18,096 (102.8)2023

Guatemala, Escuintla and Sacatepéquez account for 2 out of every 3 complaints; the department of Guatemala alone accounts for 52% (CIEN). The most common victims are bus and taxi drivers; also small shops, restaurants, corner stores, street vendors, schoolchildren, and local employees of US private companies and of the US Embassy itself (OSAC). Associated violence: 89 homicides linked to extortion in 2019 and cases of improvised explosive devices used against buses and taxis over non-payment (for example an IED on a bus in zone 7, January 2019, Barrio 18). Hard data by type of formal business (retail, construction, manufacturing) could not be recovered.

Figures

Concentración de denuncias en el depto. de Guatemala52%2023

Homicidios vinculados a extorsión892019

no breakdown by type of business

According to police records compiled by CIEN (January 2024), about 80% of extortions are committed by gang "imitators" — prisoners with a phone calling at random, one-off demands, often through deception — and about 90% of extortions originate inside a prison. The operational implication: much of the risk can be filtered out with telephone protocols and does not require a territorial gang presence. Systematic territorial extortion ("rent") by Barrio 18 and MS-13 is concentrated on public transport and neighbourhood retail in the areas they control.

Figures

Extorsiones cometidas por imitadores~80%2024 (boletín)

Extorsiones originadas en cárceles~90%2024 (boletín)

Article 261 of the Criminal Code (Decree 17-73, as amended by Decree 17-2009) punishes extortion with 6 to 12 years in prison, non-commutable (penalty cross-checked in ONSEC's consolidated text). The Act Against Organized Crime (Decree 21-2006) adds intimidatory exactions (art. 10) with 6 to 8 years (tier-c text, to be cross-checked against Mingob's PDF); extortionate obstruction of traffic (art. 11) was amended by Decree 11-2025 (the Anti-Gang Law, Nov 2025) and its penalty in force remains to be verified in the amended text.

Figures

Pena por extorsión (art. 261 CP)6–12 años, inconmutablevigente

Exacciones intimidatorias (art. 10 LCDO)6–8 añosvigente (tier c)

the penalty under the amended art. 11 of the Act Against Organized Crime remains to be verified

According to CIEN (January 2024), of about 110,000 complaints filed with the Public Prosecutor's Office (MP) over 12 years, 20% were still active (22,000) and 80% closed (88,000); of those closed, 69% were shelved, 24% dismissed and only 6% reached a verdict (5,200 cases); about 8,000 people have been sentenced, 88% of them convicted. The funnel explains why the public response does not replace private protocols.

Figures

Denuncias de extorsión al MP~110,000 en 12 añosa 2024

Casos concluidos con sentencia6% (5,200)a 2024

Sentencias condenatorias88% de ~8,000 sentenciadosa 2024

49% of large-scale hold-ups against container trucks and lorries take place on the Pacific route (CA-9 Sur / CA-2 towards Puerto Quetzal and the border), according to Prensa Libre (23 May 2025); the PNC agrees that "the Pacific route is the one that records the largest number of these thefts". The routes to both seaports are the highest-risk for goods (AGN, 12 Oct 2024). On road risk (not criminal risk), OSAC singles out the CA-1 and the CA-9 towards the Caribbean coast as especially dangerous because of heavy traffic and poorly maintained vehicles, and advises against intercity travel at night and in favor of convoys of at least 2 vehicles outside the capital.

Figures

Atracos a gran escala en la Ruta al Pacífico49%2025

Press series (Prensa Libre, 23 May 2025, citing Ana Beatriz Herrera of the private sector, and 7 Jun 2024, CGTC): 2017-2018 ~200 thefts/month ("the worst years"); 2019-2020 ~58/month; 2021 a rebound to ~190/month; 2022 ~129 containers/month; 2023 back to ~200/month; early 2024 10-15 thefts/week (CGTC, executive director José Alejandro Ramírez); April–December 2024 a fall to ~2/month and 2 cases from 1 Jan to 15 Apr 2025 (PNC statistics cited in the same report). The primary theft areas are Escuintla and Chimaltenango; the goods are distributed from warehouses to markets in Guatemala, Escuintla, Chimaltenango and Santa Rosa.

Figures

Robos de transporte pesado~200/mes2017-2018 y 2023

Robos de contenedores10–15/semanainicios 2024

Robos (estadística PNC)~2/mes; 2 casos 1-ene a 15-abr-2025abr-2024 a abr-2025

series flagged: change of source and possible change of legal classification

Not without an explanation. The 2017-2023 and early-2024 figures come from private-sector spokespeople (Ana Beatriz Herrera, who monitors about 12,000 units; CGTC) and refer to "thefts" or "containers" with no published definition; those from April 2024 onwards are "PNC statistics" cited in the same report. A collapse of roughly 100× coincides with the change of source and possibly of legal classification (completed theft vs attempt; whole truck vs cargo). Until the PNC series and its definition can be obtained — there is no public dataset; the candidate route is a freedom-of-information request to the Ministry of the Interior (Mingob) — the table documents a press account, not a datum (contradiction #31 in the index).

do not publish the fall without explaining the change of source

Since 2024 the use of high-end jammers has been recurrent: they block every band (GPS, WiFi, mobile) of the tractor unit, of the escort and even of patrol cars; they are portable and programmable and are bought online "at a range of prices" (Prensa Libre, 7 Nov 2024, National Transport Coordinating Body); they cost up to Q25,000 and are imported from China (Prensa Libre, 23 May 2025). Typical structure: 5-6 armed people in two vehicles; three methods — interception on the road, boarding when the driver stops, or deception by faking a mechanical breakdown. It is theft "on demand": traders order products and the gang looks for the container carrying them; participants include people from heavy transport itself, lawyers and warehouse owners.

Figures

Valor de un bloqueador de señalhasta Q25,0002025

The value of the goods per stolen container truck ranges from Q30,000 to Q500,000 (Prensa Libre, 23 May 2025). As of November 2024 signal jammers were not regulated by law; the Congressional Interior Committee proposed that only Mingob be allowed to acquire them, with penalties of 3 to 7 years for private possession (the bill's status was not tracked). Standard regional escort practice is an armed escort in a vehicle or riding in the cab, GPS reporting points and a post-delivery report (promotional claim); insurers' requirements (mandatory GPS, escort above certain insured values) could not be recovered from a public source.

Figures

Valor de mercadería por furgón robadoQ30,000–500,0002025

Pena propuesta por posesión de bloqueadores3–7 años (propuesta, nov-2024)2024

insurers' requirements not public

In 2024 the Ministry of the Interior (Mingob) set up a security working group with the private sector: real-time monitoring of about 12,000 heavy-transport units and a protocol for alerting PNC stations directly, with a response in under 3 minutes through assigned telephone numbers. Reported results: 73 people arrested in 2024 and 9 more up to 15 Apr 2025, 21 jammers seized in 16 months and 3 networks dismantled (Prensa Libre, 23 May 2025); the PNC separately reported 7 truck-theft gangs broken up between January and October 2024 and more than 30 arrests for aggravated robbery (7 Nov 2024).

Figures

Unidades monitoreadas~12,0002024-2025

Capturados73 en 2024 + 9 al 15-abr-20252024-2025

Bandas desmanteladas (PNC)7, >30 detenidosene–oct 2024

The law in force is Decree 52-2010, the Act Regulating Private Security Services, whose full text is available from the Judiciary's Center for Judicial Analysis and Documentation. Its predecessor is Decree 73-70, the Private Police Act (published 4 Nov 1970), the regime under which some older companies still hold ministerial or governmental accords.

DIGESSP (the General Directorate of Private Security Services), a unit of the Ministry of the Interior (Gobernación) founded on 2 May 2011, authorizes entities and issues licenses (series A/B/H) and agent credentials. Its register of entities (a 56-page PDF) publishes, for each company: corporate name, trade name, legal representative, address, license number, and issue and expiry dates — a direct input for vetting a supplier before contracting.

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Fundación de la DIGESSP2-may-20112011

Article 66 of Decree 52-2010 ("Illegal service") makes it a criminal offense to provide private security services without authorization or without an operating license, punishable by 6 to 12 years in prison and a Q100,000 fine (read in the Judiciary's text during audit); the same liability extends to anyone who knowingly contracts such services (Chapter IV, Offenses). Checking a supplier's license in the DIGESSP register is therefore a compliance obligation of the party doing the hiring.

Figures

Pena por servicio ilegal de seguridad privada6–12 años de prisión y multa de Q100,000vigente

Market prices for guards and monitoring are not systematically public; they require direct quotes from companies in the DIGESSP register. DIGESSP publishes a "Cost Table for Private Security Service Providers", but those are fees for procedures and licenses, not market prices (content not extracted). One commercial reference point, described by a regional provider as an "unofficial estimate": armed cargo escort "from USD 150 a day" and satellite monitoring "from USD 50 a month per unit".

Figures

Custodia armada de carga (referencia promocional)desde US$150/día2026

Monitoreo satelital por unidad (referencia promocional)desde US$50/mes2026

prices not public; promotional reference

275 authorized private security entities, according to the list published by DIGESSP's General Secretariat and dated 08 Jul 2026 (rows 1-275 of the 56-page PDF, counted in audit), including entities authorized by ministerial or governmental accord prior to Decree 52-2010. Many authorized companies report 0 valid agent credentials, a sign that the credentialling of individuals lags behind the authorization of companies.

Figures

Entidades de seguridad privada autorizadas27508-jul-2026

19,977 agents held valid credentials as of 31 Jul 2026 (289 listed providers plus 3 investigators and 16 escorts registered in a personal capacity; the "TOTAL 19977" row of DIGESSP's official PDF). The largest employers of credentialed agents: Alfa Uno, S.A. (3,458), Wackenhut de Guatemala (2,789), Seguridad y Vigilancia El Ébano (1,674), VISEGUA (867) and ALCORSA (335). This is the formal floor, not the real size of the market: the total number of formal and informal guards, and the guard-to-police ratio, could not be recovered from a citable source.

Figures

Agentes con credencial vigente19,97731-jul-2026

Alfa Uno / Wackenhut / El Ébano3,458 / 2,789 / 1,674 credenciales31-jul-2026

formal floor; total universe of guards has no source

Yes, by two multilateral or bilateral routes: Guatemala is a member country of MIGA (World Bank), whose guarantees cover inconvertibility, expropriation, war and civil disturbance for foreign investors; and the DFC (U.S. International Development Finance Corporation) offers political risk insurance against losses from currency inconvertibility, government interference and political violence, including terrorism. Active MIGA projects and DFC projects in Guatemala could not be retrieved (the search tools load through JavaScript) and remain to be verified.

active MIGA/DFC projects in Guatemala unverified

Guatemalan insurers are supervised by the Superintendency of Banks (SIB) and belong to the trade association AGIS (Guatemalan Association of Insurance Institutions); the property and casualty lines include goods in transit. Checking cargo insurance policies when contracting an escort is a practice the sector itself recommends (promotional claim). Premiums, exclusions for theft involving a jammer and insurers' technical requirements (GPS, minimum escort by insured value) are not public; SIB's statistical bulletins ought to carry premiums and loss ratios by line (not extracted). AGIS contact: +502 2361-7057; the presence of Marsh and AON remains to be verified.

premiums and insurers' requirements not public